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Abstract
The aim of cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) is to inform the allocation of scarce resources.
CEA is routinely used in assessing the cost-effectiveness of specific health technologies by
agencies such as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in England
and Wales. But there is extensive evidence that, because of barriers of accessibility and
acceptability, CEA has not been used by local health planners in their annual task of
allocating fixed budgets to a wide range of types of health care. This paper argues that these
planners can use Socio Technical Allocation of Resources (STAR) for that task. STAR builds
on the principles of CEA and practice of Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis
(PBMA). STAR uses requisite models to assess the cost-effectiveness of all interventions
considered for resource reallocation by explicitly applying the theory of health economics to
evidence of scale, costs and benefits; with deliberation facilitated through an interactive
social process of engaging key stakeholders. In that social process the stakeholders generate
missing estimates of scale, costs and benefits of the interventions, develop visual models of
their relative cost-effectiveness and interpret the results. We demonstrate the feasibility of
STAR by showing how it was used by a local health planning agency of the English NHS, the
Isle of Wight Primary Care Trust, to allocate a fixed budget in 2008 and 2009.
1. Introduction
A central problem of healthcare systems funded through taxation or social insurance is to decide
what services to offer, given a limited budget. Health economists have developed the tool of
1 The work was supported by a research grant from The Health Foundation (Registered Charity 286967). At
the time of this work, Jenifer Smith was employed full time by the Isle of Wight NHS PCT.
2cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to tackle this problem 1,2. Its key idea is that decisions over
which services ought to be funded should be made on the basis of, or at least meaningfully
informed by, a comparative analysis of the costs of those programs, and the health benefits that
those services deliver, and to whom.  Within the mainstream of health economics, health benefits
are generally measured in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), 3 which can be interpreted as
the quantum of health or as the utility generated by this quantum 4.
Conducting CEA, as laid out theoretically, is demanding. It requires systematic literature reviews
of randomized controlled trials and significant technical expertise, as demonstrated by the work
of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the making of
recommendations on funding new drugs5. The analysis underpinning NICE’s recommendations
are difficult to understand for people who are not health economists 6. For institutions such as
NICE, this lack of transparency is less important than being able to demonstrate that their
judgments are based on rigorous analysis with the objective that they are able to withstand
appeals and legal challenges by manufacturers and organisations representing patients’ groups or
professionals 7. To achieve this rigor, NICE depends on about two thousand external experts 8 and
spends on average £150,000 for conducting CEA on each new drug 9.
The practice of NICE is close to a canonical form of CEA and appropriate for one-off adopt-
reject decisions over a single intervention or procedure. CEA is not, however, appropriate for
local decisions on resource allocation over the mix of services that ought to be provided, 10 which
entail making trade-offs to allocate a fixed budget every year within national policies.
We adopt the characterization by Bryan and colleagues 6,11 who identified two types of barriers in
applying CEA: ‘accessibility’ and ‘acceptability’. These barriers concern the ability to understand
the details, and accept the assumptions, of the analyses. Accessibility is compromised because of
the need for specialist health economics skills to interpret the results of CEA and lack of access to
data used in the analysis. The acceptability of CEA is limited because of ethical reasons, in
particular the use of QALYs6,12 which do not currently reflect relevant aspects of health such as
the irreversibility of a disease or the burden on carers; the focus on efficiency rather than equity
or the minimization of catastrophic risk10,13; and concerns over the choice of the threshold cost-
effectiveness value, over which interventions are deemed cost-ineffective and should not be
funded. Evidence from the UK suggests that the range of threshold values used by the NICE may
3be too high  and that potentially highly cost-effective interventions for which no CEA is available
may be displaced in order to fund others of lower but documented cost-effectiveness 14,15.
The development of Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA)16-19 is a constructive
response to the need for a different approach from CEA for making decisions on the allocation of
resources at the local level. PBMA is a pragmatic approach to engage local managers and
healthcare professionals in understanding where resources are currently spent and in assessing the
benefits of shifting resources from a list of interventions that currently deliver low benefits to a
list of new, more beneficial interventions within the same budget. Benefits are defined by locally
agreed, multiple criteria, and, in principle these are aggregated in a benefit score using Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA).  The problem in practice, however, is that there is no clear
conceptual framework specified for the application of the theory of MCDA20. A review of PBMA
in practice for setting priorities for healthcare has identified a lack of rigor in the application of
MCDA, 21,22 which has been recognized as a problem by leading practitioners of PBMA.18
In this paper, we build on the strengths of CEA and PBMA to develop STAR (Socio Technical
Allocation of Resources) which is designed to be used locally. STAR is a socio-technical process.
The social process entails engaging local key stakeholders (including patients, clinicians and
managers) in building a model of the problem at hand with the help of a facilitator and visual
models. The technical process is the use of visual models based on the principles of CEA to
specify how MCDA ought to be applied.
We present a case study to demonstrate the application of STAR locally. This research and
development was conducted in collaboration with the Isle of Wight Primary Care Trust (PCT) of
the English NHS on how best to spend £1m of growth money in 2008. At that time PCTs were
responsible for designing contracts with providers defining the type and volume of activity they
expect to purchase to meet the health needs of the local population (on average about 330,000
people). As the local planning and purchasing agency of the NHS, PCTs were funded through
general taxation distributed by a capitation formula23. Following the major healthcare reform
announced in 2010, the Isle of Wight Clinical Commissioning group formally took on these
responsibilities from April 2013.
4Section two describes the research methods. Section three presents the case study in terms of
context, terms of reference, the deliberative approach (formal analysis, communication procedure
and interactive elicitation methods) and results. Section four discusses the strengths and limitation
of the approach on overcoming barriers to the use of CEA; section five provides concluding
remarks.
2. Methods
The approach was organised around evaluation workshops with stakeholders in the form of
‘decision conferences’. Decision conferencing (DC), like PBMA, is a deliberative process. An
impartial facilitator works iteratively with key stakeholders to generate a formal, ‘requisite’
model to assess options on multiple objectives using Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)
and generate a summary benefit score 24. A model is ‘requisite’ when it is sufficient to represent
the mental models, beliefs about uncertainty and preferences of the participants and additional
model refinements do not generate new insights in the problem 25.
The analysis is based on extensive field notes, which include: the chronological development of
the stakeholder engagement process and of the prioritisation technique, comments and reflections
on these developments of the Strategic Planning group, semi-structured and unstructured
interviews with clinical staff and PCT managers, email correspondence with PCT staff, direct
observation of workshops, flipcharts produced by workshop participants, clarification questions
and comments received on the report summarizing the results of the analysis.
3. Case study
Organisational context and term of reference
In 2008 the Isle of Wight NHS PCT was responsible for healthcare for an Island off the South-
East coast of England with a population of about 140,000. The PCT was comparatively small and,
in contrast to elsewhere in England, it was organised as an integrated healthcare system with both
purchasing and provision responsibilities, but with governance arrangements to ensure separation
of responsibilities. The analysis of local mortality and disease morbidity conducted by the
5director of Public Health (JS)26 highlighted five key priority areas to focus on to reduce mortality
and improve quality of life: cardiovascular disease, cancer, respiratory conditions, mental health
and children’s health. The financial accounts highlighted a surplus of about £1m that the PCT
could allocate on a recurrent basis from 200827. The PCT, which had a duty to engage local
stakeholders, used decision conferencing to involve stakeholders in the five identified priority
areas to generate a robust plan for allocating the additional £1m. The PCT Board recommended
looking at costs and using three criteria to identify value: to increase health, to reduce health
inequalities, and to be operationally and politically feasible.
STAR
The case study ran from April to November 2008 and consisted of:
i. a schedule of meetings (two initial meetings in the spring and then fortnightly
from June);
ii. the design, in collaboration with the PCT, of a social process to engage key
stakeholders (including managers, clinicians, patients and public representatives)
and of a technical process to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of all
interventions considered for funding;
iii. guidance on extracting information from available demographic and
epidemiological data to support the evaluation of different interventions;
iv. facilitation of meetings with stakeholders;
v. analysis of results;
vi. the production of a report to document the process and to identify
recommendations from the analysis; and
vii. follow-up assistance in performing supplementary analyses.
Executive level leadership was provided through a Strategic Planning Group (SPG), which
consisted of all eight executive directors of the PCT (including JS) and the facilitator of the
decision conferences (MA). Its remit was to design an engagement process, choose a
prioritisation technique and put forward recommendations to invest available, additional
resources. Commissioning managers were involved in the detailed planning of the events. A
commissioning manager is responsible for the implementation of the PCT strategy, for instance
by designing and monitoring contracts with providers in a particular disease area.
6The agreed engagement process consisted of two types of events. The first type was a two-hour
meeting for each of the five priority areas to identify key issues in the provision of healthcare and
to put forward a list of initiatives to improve quality of life and reduce health inequalities. A mix
of stakeholders was invited, chosen by the commissioning managers to represent the diverse
perspectives that they wished to consider in allocating resources and included: acute and
community care clinicians, council representatives, voluntary sector representatives, nurses,
public and patients’ representatives, managers of the hospital and the ambulance service. The
number of participants varied between 10 and 30 (a total of about 100 people were involved in
total). The second type of event was a one-day decision conference to prioritise the proposed
initiatives and to put forward recommendations to allocate resources across different priority
areas. Twenty-five stakeholders attended the event: the eight executive directors of the PCT, nine
commissioning managers, three patients and public representatives, four clinical experts and one
representative of social services.
The area specific workshops identified twenty-one initiatives to be prioritised. Their total cost
was over £5m. The proposed initiatives were described on a standard template reporting available
information on: the expected costs, the estimated number of people who would benefit, a
description of the ‘average’ beneficiary (in terms of demographics, severity of the condition,
socio-economic background) and a quantitative or qualitative description of the health benefits to
patients, their families and caregivers.
In the decision conference, participants built a formal model of the costs and value of all twenty-
one strategic interventions (indexed by j) interactively, in terms of:
 costs (cj): the additional annual funding required in 2009 and 2010 to set-up and to run
the intervention, compared to current care. Set-up costs included training and equipment,
and the running costs included staffing;
 population health benefit (Nj*Bj): the product of the number (Nj) of patients who benefit
from the intervention and the potential benefit (Bj) in quality (and length) of life,
assuming successful implementation, to the ‘typical’ beneficiary (e.g. QALY gains),
compared to current care;
 health inequalities (Ij): the extent to which the intervention has the potential for reducing
both differences in access and differences in health outcomes (across geographical areas,
between men and women, of special groups);
7 feasibility (pj): Probability of success (from 0% to 100%) of achieving the assessed
benefits, assuming funding is granted and taking into account: ease of implementation;
availability of workforce; acceptability to stakeholders (e.g. willingness to make this
change happen); process complexity (e.g. number of steps required). This criterion
captures the concept of ‘operationally and politically feasible’ that the Board included in
the SPG’s terms of reference.
The formal model underpinning the evaluation is to Max j E(vj) * xj, where
E() indicates an expected value calculation,
vj is the benefit from intervention j (details of its calculation will be provided later), and
xj is an index variable with value 1 in case intervention j is funded, and value 0 in case it
is not.
In the model used during the workshop, we made a simplifying assumption about the expected
value calculation (E()): that if the intervention j were successful (with probability pj); then it
would have delivered its benefits in full, and if it were unsuccessful (with probability 1-pj), then it
would have delivered no benefit. This assumption was subjected to sensitivity analysis after the
stakeholder event through a parameter k[0,1], which represented the proportion of benefits that
would have been achieved in case of unsuccessful interventions. The workshop participants were
presented with accessible visual aids for each step of the process, which will be described below
(and not the formal model and its notation). The budget constraint was not modeled explicitly
because the PCT had some flexibility on allocating resources in the current and the subsequent
year. The aim of the technical model was hence to generate a priority list of the 21 interventions
in terms of their cost-effectiveness and to agree on the budget to spend that year.
Participants revised the information provided in standard templates. These templates listed each
initiative eligible for funding in a specific commissioning group or priority area (g, which
corresponded to the priority area specific stakeholders’ workshops). The templates also evaluated
each initiative, one criterion at a time, one commissioning group at a time through scoring. Table
1 reports the assessment for the three proposed interventions by the commissioning lead for
cancer services, who also commissioned all palliative care. This required, for each intervention:
 Validating the number N of people who would benefit (using demographic and
epidemiological statistics, data on hospital admissions and expert judgment).
8 Providing a description of the typical patient and agreeing on a qualitative description of
the expected benefit (derived from clinical evidence of effectiveness and expert
judgments).
 Quantifying the expected benefit B for that typical patient attributable to action within the
budget period (benefits that might extend over the patient’s lifetime, assuming successful
implementation and compliance). This assessment was informed by evidence (e.g. of
QALY gains) whenever available. Due to time constraints and the exploratory nature of
this approach, we used direct rating with a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) technique 28,29
on the basis of the evidence brought to bear by clinical experts attending the meeting as
follows: participants identified the option providing the greatest individual health benefit
which was assigned a score of 100; they then scored the remaining interventions relative
to this benchmark score of 100 and a fixed benchmark of 0 corresponding to ‘no
additional health benefits compared to current care’. A rectangle summarized the
population health impact N*B visually (Figure 1), with the numbers who benefit on the
horizontal axis and the average benefit per person on the vertical axis. The area of the
rectangle is the expected overall benefit of the intervention in the population.
 Assessing the impact on reducing health inequalities I on a VAS. Interventions that had
no impact on health inequalities were given a score of zero. Participants identified the
option with the greatest potential to reduce health inequalities (assuming successful
implementation and compliance); this was assigned a score of 100 and the remaining
options scored relative to this benchmark.
 Assessing the operational and political feasibility of the option by asking participants
their degree of belief that it would deliver the stated benefits in probabilistic terms p (with
100% representing absolute confidence).
In case of disagreement, participants explored the reasons and sought a consensus view, which
was usually reached. If a consensus view could not be arrived at, the range of proposed values
was recorded for sensitivity analysis purposes and the majority’s view at the end of the discussion
used for the base model.
9Table 1
Initiative [j]
No.
who
benefit
per
year
[Nj]
‘Average’
beneficiary
Description of individual
benefit compared to
current care
Health
benefit
per
person
score
[Bj]
Health
inequality
reduction
score [Ij]
Feasibility
(Probability
of success)
[pj]
Early
detection &
diagnosis in
cancer
200
Person in her/his
mid-60s, more
likely to be
female and from
“hard to reach”
groups in society
Earlier diagnosis is
associated with better
prognosis (we assume no
benefit for people
screened and with
negative results)
100 100 95%
Palliative &
End of Life
care (all
diseases)
1,500
Person in her/his
late 70s, with life
limiting long
term health
condition, equally
likely to be from
any socio-
economic groups
Benefits to
carers/family/friends.
Benefits to patient: no
change in life expectancy
but a better quality of life
in its last months
75 50 70%
Relocation
of active
treatment
in cancer
300
Person in her
mid-60s, more
likely to be
female; extremely
severe illness
Patients are already
receiving this treatment
off the island, but there
are psychological benefits
of providing the service
locally
25 0 10%
Figure 1 The rectangles of health benefit to the population for the three proposed initiatives in
Cancer. Similar rectangles were drawn for each of the five areas and their interventions
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The facilitator elicited three vectors of weights from participants in order to convert the scores on
the two separate criteria of population health benefit (B) and health inequality reduction (I) to a
common metric30 With the first two vectors of weights, 1 6( ,..., ,..., )B B B Bgw w w w and
1 6( ,..., ,..., )I I I Igw w w w , participants considered one objective at a time and assessed the relative
contribution to achieving the given objective by investing in a set of interventions in a disease
group g (e.g. all proposed initiatives in the Cancer area) compared to another (e.g. all proposed
initiatives in the Respiratory one). These weights are ‘within-criteria weights’, i.e. rescaling
factors to convert scores for the same criterion in different disease areas on a common scale.
Twelve within-criteria weights were elicited in total and a weight of 100 was assigned to the
highest Bgw and the highest
I
gw . Then participants considered health benefit and inequality
reduction criteria and assessed their relative contribution to achieve the PCT’s objectives (an
‘across-criteria weight’), to convert scores on different criteria to a common value scale. To elicit
this weight, participants considered the disease areas that received the highest within criteria
weights of 100. A single rescaling factor W was sufficient to render scores on the health
inequality criterion commensurable with scores on the health benefit criterion. The weighting
judgments express critical value tradeoffs, and the facilitator encouraged participants to discuss
these tradeoffs openly, noting uncertainty and disagreements to be explored by sensitivity
analysis.
Defining ( )g j as the commissioning group of intervention j, the expected value of each
intervention was hence calculated as follows (assuming k=0 during the decision conference and k
[0,1] in sensitivity analysis after the event):
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 )B I B Ij j g j j j g j j j g j j j g j jE v p w N B W w I p k w N B W w I               
.
Thus, at the core of the analysis was a value model based on the expected value, with value
computed as a weighted additive combination of health gain and inequality reduction.  There is
precedent for this model structure in the decision analysis literature: for example, Keeney and
Winkler 31 also present an additive model with absolute and distributional components for
evaluating risk reductions.
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Participants were presented with a triangle that focused the discussion on the cost-effectiveness of
each intervention (Figure 2):
 The horizontal side of the triangle represents the additional cost cj associated with the
intervention;
 The vertical side represents the additional expected benefit score E(vj); and
 The slope of the hypotenuse of the triangle represents cost-effectiveness with the steeper
the slope the greater the ratio of health benefits to costs.
Showing the triangles stimulated a discussion both for their comparative size and slope. In most
cases participants recognized the comparison as a fair representation of their intuitive judgments,
but they had now a language to entertain a more informed discussion. In few cases results were
not intuitively clear and these were explored extensively by revising the assessments of costs and
benefits that constituted the scale and slope of the triangle creating a better understanding of the
appraised interventions. Whenever necessary, assessments were revised following this
exploration.
Figure 2 The structure of a value-for-money triangle
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Results
The triangles were used to generate a priority list in which interventions were ranked according to
value-for-money (Table 2). This ranking is similar to a league table (but is of QALY/cost).
Extensive sensitivity analysis was used to explore the uncertainties and disagreements among
participants and the model proved robust, i.e. although the value-for-money score of some
intervention changed, their relative ranking with respect to other interventions did not and
participants could make clear recommendations to the Board. Figure 3 shows the same
information in graphical form. The visual display generated important learning: for example, one
intervention the evaluation of which had attracted considerable attention within the organisation
was represented by a triangle which was not only shallow (and thus relatively cost-ineffective),
but tiny, because it touched such a small number of people. Hence that intervention had
negligible impact on population health perspective and costs.
Figure 3 The efficient frontier of triangles ranked by value-for-money
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Table 2
Commissioning
area [g]
Intervention
[j]
Additional
cost in £k
[cj]
Additional
benefit
[E(vj)]
VfM ratio
[E(vj)/cj]* Cumulativecost in £k
Cumulative
Benefit#
RESPIRATORY pneumonia £75 11.84 0.1579 £75 11.84
MENTAL
HEALTH
Dementia
services £50 5.18 0.1036 £125 17.02
CVD TIA & 2ndaryprevention £130 5.40 0.0415 £255 22.42
MENTAL
HEALTH Prison MH £150 4.51 0.0301 £405 26.94
CHILDREN Obesity training £60 1.73 0.0289 £465 28.67
CHILDREN Workforcedevelopment £100 2.78 0.0278 £565 31.44
MENTAL
HEALTH Psych therapies £120 3.05 0.0254 £685 34.49
CANCER Early detection
and diagnostics £300 5.74 0.0191 £985 40.23
CHILDREN CAMHS School £160 2.76 0.0173 £1,145 42.99
CVD Prevention £650 10.48 0.0161 £1,795 53.48
CHILDREN CAMHS 1:1 £80 1.26 0.0157 £1,875 54.73
CVD Cardiac Rehab £100 1.29 0.0129 £1,975 56.02
MENTAL
HEALTH
Alcohol misuse
svc
£300 3.77 0.0126 £2,275 59.78
MENTAL
HEALTH Social inclusion £300 3.75 0.0125 £2,575 63.54
CANCER Palliative &EOL £760 9.05 0.0119 £3,335 72.59
CHILDREN Obesity 1:1 £140 1.22 0.0087 £3,475 73.81
CHILDREN Primaryprevention £600 4.61 0.0077 £4,075 78.42
CHILDREN Access to dental £480 3.24 0.0068 £4,555 81.66
CANCER
Relocating
Active
Treatment
£50 0.31 0.0062 £4,605 81.97
CVD Stroke
emergency £600 3.37 0.0056 £5,205 85.34
CVD CHD acute £300 0.78 0.0026 £5,505 86.12
Three weeks after the decision conference, participants received a copy of the report for
consultation. The report summarized the approach, documented each step of the process, and the
results of the base models and of sensitivity analyses. The executive directors and commissioning
leads discussed the results and proposed an investment plan based on the analysis to the IoW
NHS Board for approval. The proposal followed the ranking of Table 2, with the exception of
End of Life care, for which separate funding was sought in addition to the planned £1m.
The IoW NHS Board received the results of the analysis favorably and approved the proposed
operational plan, including the provision of additional funds for End of Life care. The following
year, 2009, the PCT hired a private consultancy firm of trained decision analysts able to replicate
14
the approach and participants from the previous year confirmed their willingness to engage in the
workshops, which were extended to more people.  Thus the approach we introduced was valued
by the local organisation as a good way of continuing to make strategic decisions.
4. Discussion
This section discusses how the use of requisite models and the engagement of stakeholders in a
facilitated, deliberative process contributed to the systematic use of CEA principles. We frame
this discussion in terms of the concepts of accessibility and acceptability as used in Bryan and
colleagues 6,11.
Accessibility
The visual aids proved essential to make the CEA framework accessible to non-health
economists. The use of rectangles to visualise the population health gain helped clinicians and
patients to share their knowledge and to articulate their opinions on the impact for the individual
patient; and it enabled participants to discuss more clearly the details of the implementation, the
number of beneficiaries and the associated costs, and to document the rationales of agreed
funding recommendations. The visualisation of cost-effectiveness through triangles and their
aggregation in an efficient frontier was particularly useful to communicate the principles of CEA
as evidenced by comments from several participants (mostly managers and patients
representatives), who felt they could fully appreciate the meaning of QALY/cost estimates for the
first time.
The understanding of the evaluation framework was crucial both to incorporate available clinical
and epidemiological evidence and to assess interventions for which evidence was missing or
weak. This was particularly important for interventions in primary prevention, which were seen as
critical locally, but for which hard evidence was not available. Our approach enabled participants
to volunteer estimates, for these to be challenged by others, and their robustness to be tested by
sensitivity analysis.
The decision conference showed problems in capturing impacts of interventions in reducing
health inequalities. If these were measured in terms of the health gap between different groups in
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the population, for instance in terms of quality-adjusted life expectancy at birth, one would expect
that the greater the number of health-poor people affected, the greater§ the impact on health
inequalities. Participants, however, did not consider the number of people affected by the
intervention unless prompted by the facilitators and the rationales used to defend their health
inequality score usually reflected their personal view of the extent of “health-poverty” of a typical
beneficiary or his/her deservingness of better health. The development of a more intuitive and
theory-based approach to modelling health inequality is the subject of further research 32.
Acceptability
The executive directors, with two different kinds of exceptions, accepted the application of
deliberate CEA: the criteria selected, the way they were defined and used, and the method used to
translate values into a priority order.  One exception was that one member objected to the use of
“an approach that aims at getting the greatest good for the greatest number”, and hence she
rejected the utilitarian principle embedded in CEA in which ‘a QALY is a QALY is a QALY’.
The core of her objection was a pragmatic one: she contended that it would have been difficult to
defend hard choices based on the utilitarian principle in front of the public or the courts. The
majority of the executive directors, however, thought that the technical analysis ought to
aggregate health gains across people additively, and leave the assessments of the political
feasibility of the recommended set of interventions to be funded to the social process. The second
exception was that the executive directors judged the approach of valuing interventions in terms
of QALY gains undervalued interventions for palliative and end of life care and that a different
approach was required to value these interventions, which have the objective of enabling ‘a good
death’. They were unable to articulate a general, acceptable definition of ‘good death’ as different
patients and their families may have very different needs at this difficult time of their life, and ‘a
good death’ may have more to do with allowing them time to understand these needs and
respecting their wishes than with a specific healthcare intervention 33. This is a general difficulty
in aiming to use a common tool to assess curative and palliative interventions: for example, there
is an unresolved debate about the appropriate cost-effectiveness threshold for end of life
treatments, with some advocating a higher cost per QALY threshold 34,35.
The assessment of preventative interventions and potentially life-saving interventions posed a
similar challenge, with participants invoking the principle of the ‘rule of rescue’ to express their
16
difficulty in comparing the relative health benefits across these interventions. That principle
recognizes the moral imperative to rescue identified people in immediate peril regardless of the
costs. The executive directors decided to exclude ‘rule of rescue’ considerations in the formal
analysis in order to be able to quantify and to face the hard trade-offs between investing in
prevention compared to treatment. This is also the conclusion reached by NICE36. They
recognized that the choice between prevention and potential cure is an intrinsically difficult value
judgment, but also highlighted the value of visualising the opportunity cost of potentially life-
saving interventions in terms of forgone benefits from preventative interventions to inform their
decisions. Their difficulty is consistent with the current absence of any clear, agreed
operationalization of the rule of rescue principles 37. This analysis identified most preventative
interventions as not being high value-for-money because they were usually also associated with a
relatively low probability of success (which gave a low expected value of their benefits).
The opportunity cost of alternative budget allocations was modeled explicitly by using requisite
cost-effectiveness models. Indeed the Board found the efficient frontier particularly insightful,
because it enabled them to articulate a clear rationale for the proposed allocation based on the
principles of opportunity cost.
5.  Conclusions
The paper presents a case study to illustrate, and to demonstrate the feasibility of, a deliberative
approach to CEA. The proposed approach builds on the strengths of CEA and PBMA to develop
STAR. It is not a substitute for CEA for the purpose of technology assessment at the national
level. It does show, however, that health planners at the local or regional level could use the
principles of CEA systematically, even though evidence on the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of considered interventions is not routinely available, and could overcome the
known barriers of CEA of accessibility and acceptability. The approach builds on, and contributes
to, the PBMA literature by proposing and discussing critically a particular MCDA value function,
which is in the spirit of that proposed by Peacock et al.18
The distinctive characteristics of the approach are the use of requisite detail to assess the cost-
effectiveness of all interventions considered for funding, the use of visual aids to make CEA
concepts accessible to non-health economists, and the engagement of key stakeholders in the
17
interactive development and interpretation of the models of cost-effectiveness and the underlying
data. STAR requires a facilitator trained in health economics and MCDA. This is because the
requisite models use health economic principles and concepts to combine evidence from public
health, demographic surveys, health economic studies, RCTs, local administrative and accounting
systems. The proposed visual aids enable those with no training in health economists to
understand CEA principles and to contribute value judgments, and expert knowledge in
interpreting available evidence. Stakeholders can also assess judgmentally the cost-effectiveness
of interventions for which no published CEA is available. Although these estimates are
necessarily approximate, they are better than the alternative, which is no information.
Furthermore, these estimates represent explicitly the values and knowledge of those involved in
the resource allocation process and help them to communicate and explain the rationale of their
recommendations.
The success in facilitating clear, value-driven and evidence-based discussions are attributable to
the intellectual robustness of the underpinning health economic theory, and indeed, where our
methods lacked that underpinning, as in the modelling of inequality trading that off against health
benefit, we were less successful in informing deliberative discussions. In areas where health
economics theory has less purchase as a normative theory, in particular in the valuation of End of
Life and palliative care, those responsible for making decisions used other criteria.  This is as it
should be for healthcare, where values are contested; the highest aspiration for analysis can only
be to provide a basis for deliberative and informed moral choices.
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